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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over the certification from the United States District 
Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(1) and Rule 41, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
The issues certified by the United States District for the District of Utah are: 
1. In a first party insurance situation, may an insured recover consequential 
damages, other than attorney's fees, for breach of the express terms of an insurance 
contract? If so, what are the consequential damages that are recoverable for breach of the 
express terms of an insurance contract and how are they distinguished from the 
consequential damages for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
that are recoverable under Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 801 
(Utah 1985)? 
Standard of Review: Determining the scope of damages under a cause of action is 
a question of law. Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461 (Utah 1996). 
2. Did Utah Code Ann. § 31A-26-301, entitled "Timely Payment of Claims," 
allow a private cause of action by the insured against his or her insurer for violation of 
the statute in 2000? 
Standard of Review: Whether a statute creates a private cause of action is a 
question of law. Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, 66 P.3d 592. 
1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
U.C.A. § 31A-26-301 (effective in 2000), attached as Addendum 2 
U.C.A. § 31A-26-301 (as amended in 2002), attached as Addendum 3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below 
This case arises out of the failure of defendant UNUM Life Insurance Company of 
America to pay disability benefits to plaintiff Gary Machan pursuant to the terms of his 
disability income insurance policy. 
In October 2000, Machan filed a Complaint against UNUM in the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. The case was later removed to 
the United States District Court, District of Utah, Central Division, pursuant to diversity 
jurisdiction. 
UNUM filed a motion for summary judgment and, after briefing and oral 
argument, the Hon. Paul G. Cassell determined that the certified issues were unsettled 
questions under existing Utah law. Accordingly, Judge Cassell issued an Order of 
Certification on September 22, 2003. R. 149 (attached hereto as Addendum 1). This 
Court issued an Order of Acceptance on October 30, 2003. 
< 
i 
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Facts 
Plaintiff Gary Machan (hereinafter "Machan") received his MBA degree from 
Brigham Young University in 1969. R. Exh 17, bates UMAC173.1 For more than 
twenty years, he was a CEO and corporate executive of various companies involved in 
development, construction and management of properties throughout several western 
states. Some of his more notable projects include developing and constructing Brickyard 
Plaza, Woodland Towers, Cottonwood Medical Center, and Lindberg Plaza at the 
International Center. R. Exh 26, pp. 19-20. 
In 1988, Machan purchased a disability insurance policy from defendant UNUM. 
Unlike typical ("any occupation") disability policies, Machan paid a higher premium for 
what is commonly referred to as an "Own Occupation" policy. Under this type of policy, 
an insured is entitled to benefits if he becomes unable to perform the material and 
substantial duties of his own occupation in the usual and customary way, even if he is 
able to engage in some other occupation. R. 49, bates UGIB 380. 
Machan's policy has a common provision where disability benefits are paid if the 
insured falls within either of the following definitions: (1) "total disability," and/or (2) 
"residual disability." "Total disability" is defined: 
"Total disability" and "totally disabled" mean injury or sickness restricts 
[sic] the Insured's ability to perform the material and substantial duties of 
1
 The Record submitted to this Court by the federal court clerk does not specify a citation 
number for the exhibits that were attached to plaintiffs pleadings. Rather, the exhibits 
were placed in three expanded folders entitled, "Exhibits # 1 of 3", "Exhibits # 2 of 3", 
and "Exhibits # 3 of 3". Plaintiff will therefore cite to the original exhibit numbers in the 
record. 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
his regular occupation to an extent that prevents him from engaging in his 
regular occupation. 
"Regular occupation" means the Insured's occupation at the time the 
Elimination Period begins. If the Insured engages primarily in a 
professionally recognized specialty at that time, his occupation is that 
specialty. 
R. Exh 3, bates PL00005-6. 
UNUM marketed these "Cadillac" Own Occupation policies to highly paid 
professionals, such as corporate executives, doctors, and lawyers, to provide coverage for 
disability from their specific occupations (including their areas of specialty). For 
example, an orthopedic surgeon who could no longer perform surgery might be totally 
disabled under an "Own Occupation" policy, even though he or she could still work in 
some other area of health care. R. Exh 49. 
Machan continued to pay the premiums on his Own Occupation policy for more 
than a decade. In early 1999, Machan was diagnosed with coronary artery disease and 
underwent coronary artery bypass grafting in March 1999. Until the surgery, Machan 
was engaged full-time in his occupation. R. Exh 6, pp. 100-103. 
Unfortunately, Machan suffered serious complications as a result of the surgery, in 
particular mild vessel eschemic disease in his brain. Over a matter of months, the brain 
injury led to cognitive deficits and severe mental illnesses that UNUM now, after two 
years of litigation, acknowledges rendered Machan fully disabled.2 R. Exh 31. ( 
2
 The type of mental deficiencies and illnesses suffered by Machan are not uncommon 
after open heart surgery. His eschemic brain injury was verified objectively by MRI 
studies (R. Exh 14), by psychological testing, and by the professional judgment of his 
treating physicians and therapists. R. Exh 10, pp. 215-222; Exh 22, pp. 40-42, 65-66, 73-
4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
After March 1999, Machan was never able to return to the work he did before. 
His prior annual earned income plummeted from $200,000 or more to little or nothing 
after his surgery. R. Exh 6, pp. 55-57. 
By the summer of 1999, Machan experienced obvious cognitive deficits and 
reduced executive function in his brain. R. Exhs 7, 8 and 9. He also suffered from 
psychological problems, including severe depression and anxiety. R. Exh 23, bates 
UMAC 137-138,161-162; and Exh 11 at 139-141, 155-156. From that time, his 
symptoms have worsened and he has never returned to productive work. Id. 
In March 1999, Machan filed a notice of claim for disability benefits due to his 
heart condition. UNUM initially agreed to pay for two weeks of benefits beyond 
Machan's 120-day elimination (waiting) period. When Machan asserted that more was 
owed under the contract, UNUM offered to pay two additional months of benefits, but 
only if Machan fully and completely released all other claims for benefits, which Machan 
refused to do. R. Exh 16, pp. 156-164. UNUM denied any further benefits. 
By the spring of 2000, Machan's cognitive and psychological deficits had become 
the predominant cause of his disability. As permitted by the Policy, Machan filed another 
Notice of Claim in April 2000 based upon his mental disabilities.3 R. Exh 17. 
74, 83-88, 90-92, 98-104. His treating doctors, Drs. Traub and Lambert, and Dr. Linda 
Gummow, an expert neuropsychologist, unanimously agreed that plaintiff was not 
capable of returning to his prior occupation or any other meaningful occupation since his 
heart surgery. See, for example, R. Exh 10, pp. 155, 176-177 and 215-222; Exh 22, pp. 
38-42; Exh 12; and Exh 13,p.l55. 
3
 UNUM's Policy recognized mental incapacity as a legitimate basis for disability. 
"Sickness" that may form the basis of a covered disability is defined in the Policy as "a 
5 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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At the time that Machan submitted his disability claims, certain duties applied to 
the handling of claims, including, among other duties: (1) thoroughly and promptly 
investigating the claims, which would include a proactive investigation, not just waiting 
for the insured to send information (R. Exh 4, bates UCCM 0008; Exh 204, pp. 88-93), 
and (2) a thorough, fair, and objective evaluation of each claim, which would include 
resolving reasonable doubts in favor of the policy holder and "exploring reasonable 
theories which support payment of the benefits . . ." Id. 
There is substantial evidence, including expert testimony, that UNUM breached 
these and many other duties, as described in detail in Plaintiffs Opposition to Motion for 
Summary Judgment. R. 135, pp. xxvi - xxxvii. Despite UNUM's extensive wrongful 
conduct, the trial court, though deferring a formal ruling, indicated that it was inclined to 
grant summary judgment on most of plaintiffs causes of actions because UNUM had 
hired Dr. Peter Strang, an allegedly independent doctor.5 Apparently, the trial court felt 
mental or physical illness or condition which has been diagnosed or treated." R. Exh 3, 
bates PL 0005. UNUM's claims manual defines "limitations" on an insured's ability to 
perform the duties of his own occupation as "the mental or physical functions he cannot 
do." R.Exh4,batesUCCM0035. 
4
 Exh 20 is comprised of both the March 7, 2001 denial letter and the deposition of 
Chapman, UNUM's claims person who handled plaintiffs claim. 
5
 UNUM often uses Dr. Strang as a so-called "independent" doctor to perform "cold file" 
reviews. The evidence demonstrated that he is far from independent. Dr. Strang, who 
makes approximately $250,000 a year from UNUM, spends at least one day a week in 
UNUM's claims office doing cold file reviews, does very little clinical work, does 40% 
of his practice for UNUM, and has a bias against the claimant. He uses UNUM 
employees to prepare his report on UNUM stationary, keeps no notes or file on the 
patient, uses UNUM's address, fax and telephone number for responses from third parties 
and uses UNUM's acronyms in his report. R. Exh 45, pp. 5-27; Exh 46, pp. 8-14, 22-25, 
6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
compelled under Prince v. Bear River Mutual Ins Co., 2002 UT 68, 56 P.3d 524, to rule 
that because of Dr. Strang's involvement, UNUM's position was fairly debatable and, 
accordingly, in spite of egregious conduct, that all claims except breach of contract and 
perhaps breach of section 31A-26-301, Utah Code Ann. (assuming there is a private 
cause of action under this statute), must therefore fail. R. Tr. 7/29/03, pp. 3-4. Referring 
specifically to the Prince case, the trial court concluded that if there is a fairly debatable 
issue, "these other kinds of causes of action that you're talking about topple over like a 
set of dominos, sort of all or nothing . . . ." Id. p. 26. 
After issuing its denial letter on November 3, 2000, UNUM closed its file even 
though Machan's claim was still pending and he had commenced litigation. R. Exh 20, 
pp. 293-294. Closing a file has special significance to UNUM because it terminates the 
posted reserve amount and helps meet certain "reserve reduction" goals. Each new and 
pending claim has a reserve amount allocated to it. R. Exh 41, pp. 16-18, 24. When the 
claim is terminated, either by denial or some other resolution, the file is generally closed 
and the reserve amount allocated to that claim is subtracted from the collective total. Id. 
A denial of a new or pending claim was one way to meet improper reserve reduction 
expectations that UNUM imposed on claims personnel. Id. at 31-41. 
As articulated by various UNUM witnesses, UNUM had, for many years, 
implemented arbitrary and wrongful reserve reduction goals, sometimes referred to as 
"expectations" or "targets." These goals were designed to increase the company profits 
28-31, and Exh 47. Plaintiff also presented evidence from experts that Dr. Strang was a 
"hired gun" who gave predictable opinions for UNUM. R. Exh 39, p. 5. 
7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
by arbitrarily reducing reserves through closing files and terminating claims. (R. Exh 32 
pp. 1603-1604, 1614-1621, 1625-1629, 1636-1660, 1714-1733, 1831; Exh 41, pp. 28-41. 
Tremendous pressure is placed on claims personnel from upper management to 
meet these goals, including the employee's performance evaluations, pay, promotions, 
etc. In addition to creating conflicts of interest, these wrongful goals were foul because 
they require the reduction of claim payments or denial of claims for reasons of company 
profit and the adjuster's personal gain (bonus, etc.) rather than on the substance of any 
given claim. R. Exh 32, pp. 1603-1604, 1614-1621, 1625-1629, 1636-1660, 1714-1733, 
1831; R. Exh 34; R. 135, pp. xxxvii-xlvii, and R. 139. 
UNUM's closure goals were arbitrary and not dependent upon the merits of the 
pending claims. They were determined by a calculation nicknamed "the Arnold theory," 
in which claim termination goals were computed by taking the total number of new 
claims and subtracting the reopened reserve amounts. The balance was what Tim 
Arnold, head of the UNUM claims department, expected to be terminated or "recovered". 
R. Exh 32 at 1653. Even when a vice president over disability claims told Arnold there 
were no other claims to close, he instructed her to "go back to my unit and find the 
additional closures." Id. at 1652, 1714-20. 
Meeting reserve reduction goals was particularly problematic in the area of non-
cancellable ("noncan") individual disability policies like Machan's because in 1994, 
UNUM stopped selling them. R. Exh 41 at 18-20. After 1994, the number of existing 
noncan policies continued to decrease because policies would lapse each year for various 
reasons. Id. The number of new claims from these decreasing noncan policies was 
8 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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correspondingly decreasing over the years since 1994. Id. Because of this decrease, the 
increasing expectations to reduce total reserve dollars on claims from these policies 
created even greater pressure to terminate otherwise valid claims. 
Plaintiffs expert, Stephen Prater, confirms this scheme based on his extensive 
experience and research regarding UNUM and UNUMProvident, and addresses why 
these performance goals run afoul with the industry standards. R. 135, p. xlvii; Exh 33. 
Another expert, Barbara Paull, outlines in detail the violations of UNUM's internal and 
industry standards in her expert report and deposition through UNUM's inadequate and 
untimely investigation and a biased evaluation. R. Exh 39; and R. Exh 40. She further 
testifies that she could not find a reasonable basis, based on claims practices, for the 
denial of plaintiff s claim, and that any reliance on Dr. Strang was improper since he was 
not an "independent" nor unbiased doctor. R. Exh 39, pp. 5-7; Exh 40, pp. 190-93. 
A more detailed description of UNUM's wrongful corporate scheme, together 
with quotes and citations, is set out in Plaintiffs Opposition to Motion for Summary 
Judgment, R. 135, pp. xxxvii - xlvii. 
Partly from the financial stress caused by his disability, compounded by UNUM's 
refusal to pay any benefits and the distress from the resulting litigation, Machan's 
psychological conditions worsened. See R. Exh 10, p. 235; Exh 12 and Exh 15. He was 
forced to use his savings and consume his assets to exist. R. Exh 6, pp. 170-175. 
Machan's treating doctors and expert agree that in all likelihood he will be unable 
to have any significant gainful employment for the rest of his life. R. Exh 13, pp. 155; 
Exh 10, pp. 217-222; Exh 12, pp. 19-20. They further agree that, had he not suffered the 
9 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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financial stress from the lack of disability income, exacerbated by the emotional distress 
associated with having to fight with UNUM and to engage in protracted litigation, he 
would likely have been able to at least return to some form of gainful employment, 
though not his prior occupation. R. Exh 12, pp. 19-20. 
In spite of all of the evidence available to UNUM regarding Machan's disability, 
UNUM continued to deny his claim, issuing a final denial letter on March 7, 2001. R. 
Exh 20. The specific basis for UNUM's denial of plaintiffs claim was tenuous and 
appeared to be a pretext.6 
The case was set for trial September 9, 2002 (trial was later continued to 
September 2003). In August 2002, UNUM unexpectedly announced that it had decided 
to pay Machan's claim for benefits. In explaining this sudden reversal, UNUM stated 
that after a review of "recently submitted materials," it had determined that benefits were 
owing. UNUM wrote: "The recent information substantially supports Mr. Machan's 
claim ...." R. Exh 31. (Oddly, however, nothing had been submitted to UNUM recently. 
Machan had not submitted anything for many months, and virtually all information 
6
 For example, UNUM denied the entire claim because: (1) it couldn't determine the 
starting date of the disability, even though its claim file consistently refers to the start of 
disability as March 12, 1999 (the approximate time plaintiffs heart surgery); (2) there 
was no "objective data" to substantiate the mental illnesses, even though the policy does 
not require objective proof, nor is objective proof commonly available with mental 
illnesses; (3) it couldn't determine plaintiffs occupation, even though its own vocational 
consultant Robert Violetta concluded after researching the issue over a year before the 
denial letter, "it is my opinion that the preponderance of information on file indicates that 
Mr. Machan's occupation corresponds to construction manager," and (4) because 
Machan revoked his medical authorization to UNUM when he filed his lawsuit. R. 135 
pp. xxxii-xxxv. 
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supporting Machan's claim had been submitted more than a year before UNlUVTs August 
16, 2002 letter.) 
UNUM paid the past benefits under a reservation of rights which not only reserved 
UNUM's right to revoke future benefits, but also allowed UNUM to recover back what it 
had paid to plaintiff. R. Exh 4, bates UCCM0073. Furthermore, UNUM did not pay the 
cost of living increases, reimbursement of premiums under the waiver of premium 
provision of the policy, interest, and other benefits owed under the policy. Shortly before 
filing its motion for summary judgment, however, UNUM finally paid most of those 
additional amounts (without interest). 
The specific mechanisms of UNUM's breaches and wrongful conduct are not at 
issue in this appeal. This background, however, is important to understand the context of 
why these two issues were certified and how they relate to the certified issues. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. The law in this state has always been that a defendant who breaches a 
contract is liable for damages that were reasonably foreseeable or within the 
contemplation of the contracting parties ("consequential damages"). That this basic 
principle extends to breaches of insurance contracts was expressly recognized by this 
Court nearly half a century ago. 
UNUM argues, however, that this Court has now eliminated all claims for 
consequential damages in suits for breach of an insurance contract. UNUM's contention 
is that, when the Court earlier recognized a broader range of consequential damages for 
11 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in an insurance contract ("first-party 
bad faith"), it thereby shrank the damages that could be recovered for ordinary breach of 
contract. 
This argument is not supported by either of the two principle cases cited by 
UNUM, Billings v. Union Bankers Insurance Co., 918 P.2d 461, 466 (Utah 1996), or 
Beckv. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 1985). Instead, those 
cases upheld the principle that ordinary consequential damages are recoverable for breach 
of an insurance contract. It is only when the breach is accompanied by bad faith that 
"expanded," tort-like damages may be sought. Nothing in Billings or elsewhere in this 
Court's jurisprudence suggests that it ever intended to eliminate a longstanding element 
of contract damages merely because a defendant happens to be an insurance company. 
2. A private right of action should be recognized when an insurer violates 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-26-301, which requires timely payment of valid claims. Under 
Section 874A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the statute intends to protect an 
identifiable class of persons, of whom Machan is a member. The purpose of Section 
31 A-26-301, its wording, and legislative history all support the recognition of a cause of 
action for violation of the statute. 
ARGUMENT 
I. UTAH LAW RECOGNIZES CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES FOR 
BREACH OF AN INSURANCE CONTRACT. 
Certified Question 1 is: 
In a first party insurance situation, may an insured recover consequential 
damages, other than attorney's fees, for breach of the express terms of an 
12 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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insurance contract? If so, what are the consequential damages that are 
recoverable for breach of the express terms of an insurance contract and 
how are they distinguished from the consequential damages for breach of 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing that are recoverable 
under Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 
1985)? 
To understand the context in which this question arose, it is important to address 
the specific argument raised by UNUM in its motion for summary judgment before Judge 
Cassell. UNUM's motion argued that, in an action for breach of a first-party insurance 
contract, the only damages available to the plaintiff are the unpaid policy benefits. R. 
126, p. 2. 
According to UNUM, Billings v. Union Bankers Insurance Co., 918 P.2d 461, 466 
(Utah 1996) confirmed that consequential damages are only available in bad faith claims, 
not in claims for ordinary breach of an insurance contract. Id. at 2-3. And if Billings was 
not clear enough, UNUM says, Campbell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 
2001 UT 89, 65 P.3d 1134, rev'd on other grounds, 538 U.S. 408 (2003), "leaves no 
doubt that damages beyond the fixed dollar amount of coverage are only available for 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith." R. 141, p. 31 . 
7
 UNUM's phraseology suggests that Campbell addressed the issue of damages in 
breach of contract claims (it didn't), or that some new analysis was offered on the subject 
(it wasn't). Campbell, of course, involved third-party bad faith, not first-party bad faith 
or breach of contract. The only issue addressed in the section of Campbell quoted by 
UNUM was whether attorney fees are recoverable in third-party bad faith actions. 
Moreover, the quoted text from Campbell itself consists largely of quotes from Billings 
and Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 1985). Campbell 
offered no new views on the issues raised in those cases. Accordingly, it is not addressed 
further herein. 
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As UNUM stated: "[I]t is UNUM's position that the Utah Supreme Court elected 
to eliminate the potential for consequential damages for mere breach of contract in order 
to expand the litany of potential consequential damages available for breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. . . . For pure breach of the insurance 
contract, Machan's damages are limited to the Policy benefits." R. 126 at 3, 4. UNUM 
then claimed that it had paid all Policy benefits to which Machan was entitled, and 
therefore Machan's breach of contract claim should be dismissed. Id. at 4. 
The suggestion that no consequential damages - indeed, no damages of any kind 
except unpaid policy benefits and fees - are available for breach of an insurance contract 
is remarkable in at least two major respects. First, the theory is not supported (and, in 
fact, is contradicted) by the cases upon which it purports to be based. Second, it would 
place plaintiffs who suffer the breach of an insurance contract in a worse position than 
plaintiffs in all other contract actions, which is inconsistent with the Court's longstanding 
recognition of the special nature of insurance. 
A. Basic damages principles in insurance-related cases. 
Three causes of action are commonly asserted in connection with an insurer's 
alleged mishandling of a claim. Each has different duties and elements of proof (not at 
issue here), and, more important, each has different recoverable damages: 
1. Breach of contract. Damages for ordinary breach of contract "serve the 
important purpose of compensating an injured party for actual injury sustained so that she 
may have been restored, as nearly as possible, to the position she was in prior to the 
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injury." Mahmood v. Ross, 1999 UT 104, ^  19, 990 P.2d 933, quoting Castillo v. Atlanta 
Casualty Co., 939 P.2d 1204, 1209 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 945 P.2d 1118 (Utah 1997). 
Such damages may include "general damages, which flow naturally from the 
breach . . . ." Id. Additionally, consequential damages are also recoverable, if (and only 
if) the plaintiff can establish that the damages claimed, "while not an invariable result of 
breach, were reasonably foreseeable by the parties at the time the contract was entered 
into." Id. This limitation is sometimes characterized as requiring that consequential 
damages have been "reasonably within the contemplation of, or reasonably foreseeable 
by, the parties at the time the contract was made." Billings, 918 P.2d at 466. 
The availability of consequential damages in breach of contract actions involving 
insurance policies has been established in Utah since at least 1958. In Pacific Coast Title 
Insurance Company v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, 7 Utah 2d 322, 325 
P.2d 906 (1958), an insurer failed to pay laborers and materialmen as required by its 
contract, which led to lien foreclosure proceedings against the insured by those 
individuals. The trial court allowed recovery of legal expenses incurred in defense of the 
third-party suit, and the insurer appealed. 
This Court began its analysis: 
The rule as to what damages are recoverable for breach of contract is based 
upon the concept of reasonable foreseeability that loss of such general 
character would result from the breach. Therefore, to be compensable, the 
loss must result from the breach in the natural and usual course of events, 
so that it can fairly and reasonably be said that if the minds of the parties 
averted to breach when the contract was made, loss of such character would 
have been within their contemplation. 
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Id. at 907 (citations omitted). The Court concluded that, because it was reasonably 
foreseeable that the insurer's breach of contract would result in liens and legal 
proceedings, the plaintiff was entitled to recover its expenses in defending against those 
proceedings as consequential damages. Id., citing Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341, 156 
Eng. Rep. (1854), et al8 See also, Horton v. Gem State Mutual of Utah, 794 P.2d 847 
(Utah App. 1990) (affirming trial court's award of consequential damages for breach of 
health insurance contract). 
2. Third-party bad faith. When insurers handle claims brought by third 
parties against their insureds (as contrasted with claims brought by the insured against the 
insurer), they owe fiduciary and other duties beyond those expressed or implied in the 
insurance contract itself. Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 
1985). Consequently, when a cause of action arises out of third-party bad faith, the full 
gamut of normal tort damages are available, including punitive damages. Id.; Campbell 
v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 840 P.2d 130 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 853 
P.2d 897 (Utah 1992); Ammerman v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 22 Utah 2d 187, 450 P.2d 460, 
462(1969). 
3. Breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the first-
party context ("first-party bad faith"). This cause of action is a hybrid in Utah: not quite 
contract, not quite tort. The liability analysis is contract-based. Rather than adopt a tort 
cause of action for first-party bad faith, this Court in Beck v. Farmers Insurance 
8
 Pacific Coast's articulation of consequential damages has been cited approvingly 
on numerous occasions, including by this Court in Beck and Billings. In spite of that fact, 
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Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 798 (Utah 1985), held that "the good faith duty to bargain or 
settle under an insurance contract is only one aspect of the duty of good faith and fair 
dealing implied in all contracts and that a violation of that duty gives rise to a claim for 
breach of contract." 
Although the Beck court found a contract theory of liability more theoretically 
sound in first-party situations, the Court remained concerned about the vulnerability of 
insureds. It observed: 
An insured who has suffered a loss and is pressed financially is at a marked 
disadvantage when bargaining with an insurer over payment of that loss. Failure 
to accept a proffered settlement, although less than fair, can lead to catastrophic 
consequences for an insured who, as a direct consequence of the loss, may be 
peculiarly vulnerable, both economically and emotionally. The temptation for an 
insurer to delay settlement while pressures build on the insured is great, especially 
if the insurer's exposure cannot exceed the policy limits. 
Id. 
Because of the "unique nature and purpose of an insurance contract," which 
includes "to provide peace of mind," id. at 802, a "broad range" of consequential 
damages that may extend beyond those available in a normal contract action are 
recoverable for first-party bad faith. Id. As this Court recognized in Billings, the Beck 
court, while adopting a contract theory of liability, contemplated damages essentially 
adapted or borrowed from tort law. Billings began its analysis of this issue with a 
detailed discussion of Beck, particularly the Court's approach to the question of damages 
in that case: 
as discussed below, UNUM suggests that Billings effectively overruled Pacific. 
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We discussed the types of damages recoverable for the breach [of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing]. We began with the general rule 
that "damages recoverable for breach of contract include both general 
damages, i.e., those flowing naturally from the breach, and consequential 
damages, i.e., those reasonably within the contemplation of, or reasonably 
foreseeably by, the parties at the time the contract was made." We 
recognized that in appropriate circumstances, "consequential damages for 
breach of contract may reach beyond the bare contract terms," and 
therefore, that the monetary limits of an insurance policy do not invariably 
define the amount for which the insurer may be liable upon a breach. 
Under this framework, we proceeded to craft a damage measure for Beck's 
rather unique contract approach to the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing. 
Id. at 466 (internal citations and brackets omitted). 
The Court then indicated that, under its "unique" approach, damages recoverable 
for first-party bad faith would be more akin to those in tort than in contract: 
The Beck court observed that although it had rejected the tort approach, the 
measure of damages that the law made available for breach of the implied 
covenant should not ignore the principal reason for other courts' adoption of the 
otherwise theoretically unsound tort approach, i.e., to remove any incentive for 
insurers to breach the duty of good faith by expanding their exposure to damages 
caused by such a breach beyond the predictable fixed dollar amount of coverage 
provided by the policy. In furtherance of this purpose, we departed from the 
restrictive contract damages approach and followed a course more closely aligned 
with a tort damages approach. The Beck court concluded that a first-party insurer 
who breaches the implied covenant by unreasonably denying the insured the 
benefits bargained for may be held liable for broad consequential damages 
foreseeably caused by the breach, damages which might include those for mental 
anguish and which would be closely analogous to those available in states taking a 
tort approach. 
Id. (emphasis added).9 
The Billings court held that this "expanded consequential damage measure should 
be available only for the breach of implied covenant, not, as the court instructed the jury, 
i 
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for breach of the expressed terms of the contract." Id. (emphasis added). "It would not 
further Beck's purpose of encouraging insurers to act reasonably if we were to impose the 
broad consequential damages allowed in Beck on every insurer who is ultimately 
determined by a court to have incorrectly denied coverage, regardless of how reasonable 
the denial," the Court wrote. "Such an insurer ought to incur no greater damage exposure 
than any other person breaching the expressed terms of a contract." Id. at 466-67 
(emphasis added). 
B. Consequential damages are available for breach of an insurance contract. 
UNUM's argument would require this Court to rewrite the last-quoted portion of 
Billings: Instead of an insurer facing no greater damage exposure than an ordinary breach 
of contract defendant, an insurer would face less damage exposure than an ordinary 
breach of contract defendant. After all, "any other person breaching the express terms of 
a contract" would be liable for consequential damages, if proved. That has long been the 
law in Utah. See, e.g., Wagner v. Anderson, 122 Utah 403, 250 P.2d 577 (1952); Bevan 
v. J. H. Construction Co., Inc., 669 P.2d 442 (Utah 1983); Kraatz v. Heritage Imports, 
2003UTApp. 201 andn. 11. 
UNUM contends, however, that when this Court held a broader range of 
consequential damages to be available in first-party bad faith claims against insurers, it 
must have intended to eliminate consequential damages altogether in ordinary breach of 
9
 The analogy to tort remedies, while close, is not complete. Punitive damages, for 
example, are not available in first-party bad faith cases. 
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contract claims against insurers. (UNUM does not explain why this Court would make 
such an abrupt departure from at least 40 years' worth of jurisprudence sub silentio.) 
A similar argument was made - and rejected - in Castillo v. Atlanta Casualty Co., 
939 P.2d 1204 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 945 P.2d 1118 (Utah 1997). In Castillo, an 
insured brought suit for an insurer's failure to pay uninsured motorist property damage 
benefits. As part of his claim for breach of contract, the plaintiff sought consequential 
damages for loss of use of his vehicle. The trial court concluded that such damages 
would be recoverable, but denied them because the insured had not rented a replacement 
vehicle. 
On appeal, the insurer argued that damages for breach of an insurance contract are 
limited to the policy benefits themselves, and that consequential damages may not be 
sought. Id. at 1208 ("In effect, the insurer appears to argue that the monetary limits of the 
policy invariably define the amount for which it is liable upon a breach of the insurance 
contract") The Court of Appeals rejected that contention, noting: 
The insurer's position in this respect is incorrect. "Although the policy limits 
define the amount for which the insurer may be held responsible in performing the 
contract, they do not define the amount for which it may be liable upon a breach." 
Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 1985). 
Id. at 1208 n. 1. See also id. at 1208 ("Thus, plaintiffs' consequential damages theory is 
based on general contract law, not the provisions of the insurance policy. They are 
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correct that the policy's provisions on loss of use coverage are irrelevant to their claim 
premised on the insurer's breach of another policy provision.") 
In this case, UNUM's position appears to be based upon an assumption that, if 
consequential damages remain viable in breach of contract claims against insurers, there 
will be no difference between the damages available in a breach of contract claim and 
those available in a first-party bad faith claim. There are two principal flaws in that 
reasoning: 
First, if Beck did indeed create such a supposed anomaly, it would seem more 
appropriate to reevaluate Beck's limitations than to strip protections from an entire class 
of breach of contract claimants. 
Moreover, as made clear in the language from Billings quoted above, it simply is 
not accurate to say that recoverable damages are identical in first-party bad faith claims 
and ordinary breach of insurance contract claims. In Billings, this Court agreed that the 
same "broad" and "expanded" damages "more closely analogous to those available in 
states taking a tort approach" available for first-party bad faith are not recoverable for 
plain breach of contract. Nowhere did the Court ever suggest that, by expanding the 
damages available in bad-faith claims, it had decreased the damages available in ordinary 
contract claims. 
For purposes of answering Certified Question 1, this Court need not - nor can it -
delineate in advance each and every conceivable element of consequential damages that 
10
 The Castillo court ultimately concluded that the plaintiff was not entitled to the 
consequential damages that he claimed, but only because he had not established their 
21 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
might be available in a breach of insurance contract claim. The type of damages that 
might qualify as consequential varies, depending upon the facts of a particular case. See, 
e.g., Wagner, 250 P.2d at 579-80 (plaintiffs could recover damages "occasioned by the 
delay which the appellants can prove"); Sevan, 669 P.2d at 444 (lost favorable mortgage 
rate recoverable if due to defendant's breach of contract); Horton, 19A P.2d at 847-48 
(affirming award of damages for deterioration of medical condition as consequential 
damage of breach of health insurance contract). 
The requirement imposed upon contract claimants to prove that their consequential 
damages were within the parties' contemplation or reasonably foreseeable (a requirement 
that does not appear to be imposed, at least to the same degree, in bad faith cases) creates 
appropriate and predictable limitations upon a defendant's exposure. Whether the 
plaintiff has sufficient evidence to present a particular item of damages to the jury in a 
specific case is, obviously, best left for trial courts to address in the first instance. 
For purposes of answering the certified questions, Machan requests the Court to 
issue a clarification that whatever consequential damages would be available in a normal 
breach of contract claim remain available in a breach of insurance contract claim. If, 
however, the Court is inclined to explore Machan's factual situation, the Court should 
clarify that each of these elements (if proved) is recoverable as a consequential damage in 
Machan's breach of contract claim: 
amount. Id. at 1211. 
22 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1) Deterioration of Machan's psychological condition, including his resulting 
inability to engage in significant gainful employment as a result thereof, due to UNUM's 
breach of its obligation to pay disability benefits under the contract; 
2) Economic losses caused by depletion of his assets and savings in order to meet 
basic living expenses as a result of UNUM's breach of the contract; and 
3) Mental anguish/emotional disturbance. This element is recoverable if "the 
contract or the breach is of such a kind that serious emotional disturbance was a 
particularly likely result." Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 353. Comment a to this 
section offers an example particularly apropos to the present case: "Breach of other types 
of contracts, resulting for example in sudden impoverishment or bankruptcy, may by 
chance cause even more emotional disturbance..." Id, 
The foreseeability of these damages is indisputable. UNUM representatives have 
admitted the (self-evident) fact that the very purpose of disability insurance is to alleviate 
financial stress at a time when it is expected due to a disability. In fact, UNUM's own 
sales material warns customers: "There's too much at stake to have inadequate disability 
coverage. You work hard to maintain a comfortable lifestyle. But if you're not 
completely covered, the things you've worked for could be in jeopardy: • Your home(s). • 
Your retirement savings. • Your vacation. • Your children's education." R. Exh 50, bates 
UGIB 843. See also, R. Exh 39, p. 7, ^ 12 (reasonable insurers know that failing to pay 
benefits would likely result in financial and emotional distress, and other adverse 
consequences to the insured). 
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II. UNUM'S VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-26-301 IS 
ACTIONABLE BY A PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION. 
The second question that Judge Cassell found unsettled under Utah law is: "Did 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-26-301, entitled 'Timely Payment of Claims/ allow a private 
cause of action by the insured against his or her insurer for violation of the statute in 
2000?" 
For purposes of answering this question, it must be presumed that UNUM violated 
Section 31A-26-301 (2000), which provides: "Unless otherwise provided by law an 
insurer shall timely pay every valid claim made by an insured." The sole issue, 
accordingly, is whether an insured has a remedy if his insurer violates this statute. 
In addressing this issue, Machan acknowledges this Court's pronouncement that, 
"in the absence of a clear indication from the [statute] itself, we are 'not generally in the 
habit of implying a private right of action . . . . ' " Young v. Salt Lake City School Dist., 
2002 UT 64, \ 21, 52 P.3d 1230. Machan submits that, in this instance, the legislature 
has provided such an indication. Moreover, as the Court's qualified language notes, the 
absence of an express provision affirmatively setting forth a private right of action does 
not automatically preclude the recognition of such a right if other considerations support 
such recognition. 
Restatement (Second) Of Torts (1979) § 874A articulates the basic considerations in 
determining whether to find a private right of action in a legislative enactment: 
When a legislative provision protects a class of persons by proscribing or requiring 
certain conduct but does not provide a civil remedy for the violation, the Court may, 
if it determines that the remedy is appropriate in furtherance of the purpose of the 
legislation and needed to assure the effectiveness of the provision, accord to an 
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injured member of the class a right of action, using a suitable existing tort action or 
an new cause of action analogous to an existing tort action. 
This Court recently relied on Section 874A in deciding whether to allow damages 
for violations of the State constitution. In Spackman v. Bd. of Ed. of Box Elder County 
School Dist., 16 P.3d 533, 538 (Utah 2000), the Court noted that "there is no express 
statutory right to damages for one who suffers a constitutional tort." Quoting Section 874A, 
however, the Court determined that it had the authority under common law to "accord an 
appropriate remedy to one injured from the violation of a [legislative provision]." Id.11 
Machan asks this Court to accord him an appropriate remedy for a (presumed) 
violation of Section 31A-26-301. Section 874A references two primary considerations: 
Does the legislative provision "protect a class of persons"? Second, is the plaintiff an 
"injured member of the class"? 
The purposes of Chapter 26 of Title 31A (the Utah Insurance Code) are set forth in 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-26-101. One express purpose is "to protect claimants under 
insurance policies from unfair claims adjustment practices . . . ." Id .§ 31A-26-101(3). 
Another is "to prevent compensation arrangements for insurance adjusters that endanger the 
fairness of claims settlements . . . ." Id. § 31A-26-101(4). The legislature intended to 
protect a class of insureds, including from insurers' failure to pay claims timely. That 
conclusion is especially compelling in a case like Machan's, where the evidence suggests 
11
 The Court noted that, while Section 874A uses the term "legislative provision," 
comment a explains that "legislative provision" includes constitutional provisions. Id. at 
538 n. 9. 
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that nonpayment of the insured's benefits was not merely happenstance, but rather due to an 
insurer's unlawful profit-enhancing programs. 
It also appears that the Utah legislature intended or contemplated a private cause 
of action for breach of this statute. Subsection 31A-26-301(3) provides, "This section 
applies only to claims made by claimants in direct privity of contract with the insurer," 
with no mention that there is no private cause of action intended. By contrast, only two 
sections later, Section 31A-26-303(5) states, 'This section does not create any private 
cause of action." The notable absence of such limiting language in Section 301 suggests 
a legislative intent to allow an insured who is direct privity of contract (like Machan) to 
have a private cause of action for breach of the statute, or a recognition that such a right 
already exists. 
Legislative history further supports this conclusion. When the section was first 
enacted in 1985, it contained limiting language in subparagraph 3, "This section applies 
only to claims made by claimants in direct privity of contract with the insurer." See a 
copy of § 31A-26-301, attached as Addendum 2. The Utah Trial Lawyers Association 
became concerned that the statute created inequity by allowing only the person in direct 
privity of contract to bring an action against an insurer for failing to timely pay benefits. 
Typically, only the person or entity that signs the application for insurance is considered 
in privity, yet the insurance is usually intended to provide benefits for other insureds. For 
example, an insurance policy for an automobile might be purchased by a husband or wife. 
The policy, however, is clearly intended to provide benefits for the spouse, the children, 
and other possible insureds. The statute as worded created a remedy for only the 
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applicant, not the other intended insureds. (See Affidavits of Brian S. King and L. Rich 
Humpherys regarding Section 31A-26-301 amendment process, R. Exh 53). 
During the 2000 legislative session, UTLA attempted to submit an amendment to 
have Section 31 A-26-301 apply to all insureds under a policy, not just those technically 
"in privity." Because the proposed amendment was submitted too late, the legislature did 
not consider it that year. Thereafter, the amendment was prepared with input from the 
insurance department and insurance industry representatives, and was then introduced as 
First Substitute Senate Bill 126 in the 2001 legislative session. In the process, lobbyists 
on behalf of the insurance industry and UTLA representatives worked together in 
creating language that satisfied the concerns of both sides. See Attachments to R. Exh 
53, Transcript of House Business, Labor and Economic Standing Committee, p. 2. 
The insurance industry was concerned that the language be carefully restricted to 
apply only to insureds under the policy, to avoid an argument that a third-party claimant 
might be able to sue the defendant's liability carrier directly. Under well-established 
Utah law, third-party claimants do not have a direct cause of action against a defendant's 
liability carrier; only the insured can assert a claim. Representatives from the insurance 
department and insurance industry did not want this statute to create a new claim that has 
never existed. However, they conceded that all insureds under a policy should be entitled 
to file an action directly against their own insurance company, not just those in privity of 
contract. To address both sides' concerns, the amendment was carefully crafted to use 
the words "claim for first party benefits," with a clear description of those insureds who 
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would be entitled to make the claim. Third-party claims were carefully excluded. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-301(3), as amended 2002, attached as Addendum 3. 
During the senate committee hearing when Senate Bill 126 was addressed, 
extensive discussion ensued regarding the need to modify the statute to alleviate the 
inequity of having it apply only to persons in privity of contract. Brian S. King, a 
member of UTLA's Board of Governors, explained that the purpose of the amendment 
was to allow all insureds a direct cause of action against their insurers, not just those in 
privity, since all insureds who have been damaged by the failure of the insurer to pay 
timely benefits should have a right to recover for their damages, not just the person who 
signed the application. {See attachments to R. Exh 53, King Aff, Humpherys Aff, and 
transcripts of hearings before the House and Senate committees on February 13, 2001)12. 
After First Substitute Senate Bill 126 passed the committees, it was introduced on 
the floor of the Senate by Senator John Valentine. He explained the purpose of the bill 
and gave an example of its application: 
What Senate Bill 126 does, is it allows those people who are named insureds to 
also make claims against the insurance company rather than have to go through 
the oddball situation of having to sue the person who is in privity, so that person 
can then sue their own insurance company. 
Let me give an example in my own law firm. In my law firm we have health 
insurance, and we have a number of people who are named as the beneficiaries, 
like myself, my wife, my children, my employees, and all my other partners.... 
12
 Shortly after King began to explain the purpose and affect of § 31A-26-301 and the 
proposed amendment, the audio tape ended and there is no further record of that 
proceeding. Mr. King, however, has testified to the substance of the discussion. The 
missing portion is likewise explained in the affidavit of Humpherys, who also 
participated in the amendment process. 
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Everyone in the firm is covered by this insurance policy. However, the signator 
on the policy is my law firm, a professional corporation. 
Literally, if I've got a problem with a claim...! have to sue my own company, the 
people at my company then sue my insurance company. 
What Senate Bill 126 does, the First Substitute, is cuts through all that mess and 
says, okay, if you're a named insured you can go directly to the insurance 
company and say pay up. That's what it does. 
See attachments to R. Exh 53, Transcript of the Senate Floor, February 15, 2001, pp. 3-4. 
First Substitute Senate Bill 126 thereafter passed and became law. Section § 31A-
26-301(3), as amended, now reads as follows: 
This section applies only to a claim for first party benefits made by a person who 
is: 
(a) named or defined as an insured under the terms of an insurance 
policy; 
(b) described as a covered person under the terms of a policy of health 
care insurance as defined in Section 31 A-1 -3 01; or 
(c) named, defined, or described: 
(i) as: 
(A) an insured; 
(B) a beneficiary; 
(C) a policyholder; or 
(D) otherwise covered person; and 
(ii) under the terms of: 
(A) a life insurance policy; or 
(B) an annuity. 
While the 2002 amendment is not directly applicable to Machan (because he is in 
direct privity of contract, and therefore has always been covered by the statute), the 
legislative history surrounding the amendments to Section 31A-26-301 clearly indicate an 
intention by the legislators that a direct cause of action would exist by insureds for 
violation of the statute. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, plaintiff/co-appellant Gary Machan respectfully 
requests the Court to answer the certified questions in the following manner: 
1. To clarify that plaintiffs in breach of insurance contract actions are entitled 
to seek the same types of consequential damages available to plaintiffs in other breach of 
contract claims. 
2. To clarify that a private right of action for violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 31A-21-301 exists for plaintiffs who are within the class of persons protected by the 
statute. 
DATED this IJ th day of February, 2004. 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
L. Rich Humpherys 
Karra J. Porter 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Co-Appellant/Gary Machan 
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°
ISTRICT OF , J 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COUB^; U ' 4 ^ 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION' ^iER^ 
GARY MACHAN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UNUM LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF 
AMERICA, 
Defendant. 
Civil No. 2:00-CV-00904PGC 
ORDER OF CERTIFICATION 
The United States District Court for the District of Utah, pursuant to Rule 41 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, hereby certifies the following questions of law which are 
controlling-in the above-captioned matter now pending before this Court. 
1. In a first party insurance situation, may an insured recover consequential 
damages, other than attorney's fees, for breach of the express terms of an insurance contract? If 
so, what are the consequential damages that are recoverable for breach of the express terms of an 
insurance contract and how arc they distinguished from the consequential damages for breach of 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing that are recoverable under Beck v. Farmers 
Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 1985)? 
2. Did Utah Code Ann. § 31A-26-301, entitled "Timely Payment of Claims;' allow 
a private cause of action by the insured against his or her insurer for violation of the statute in 
2000? 
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
1. This case arises out of the claimed failure of defendant UNUM Life Insurance 
Company of America ("UNUM") to pay disability benefits to plaintiff, Gary Machan, under the 
terms of a disability income insurance policy. 
2. Mr. Machan submitted two claims to UNUM under his disability income policy: 
1) in March, 1999, following cardiac bypass surgery; and 2) in April, 2000, asserting mental 
impairment as a result of the earlier bypass surgery. Very briefly, UNUM claimed that Mr. 
Machan was either not entitled to the benefits he was claiming, or that UNUM lacked sufficient 
information to determine whether benefits were owed. 
3. This case was removed from the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, on November 17, 2000. 
4. The complaint averred five claims for relief: (1) breach of the express terms of 
the insurance contract; (2) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (3) 
intentional and/or negligent misrepresentation; (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress; 
and (5) breach of statutory duties. Mr. Machan has represented to the court that his bad faith 
claim relates solely to his second claim for benefits. 
5. Mr. Machan claimed that as a consequence of UNUM's denial of benefits, he 
suffered consequential damages, including: (1) worsening of his psychological condition; (2) 
inability to afford psychological treatment for himself and his mentally ill son; (3) depletion of 
his assets and savings in order to meet basic living expenses; and (4) the inability to have any 
significant gainful employment due to his worsened psychological condition. 
< 
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6. In September 2002, while this lawsuit was pending, UNUM made a determination 
to pay Mr. Machan his full monthly benefits under his disability policy retroactive to March 
1999. 
7. UNUM filed a motion for summary judgment in June, 2003, challenging each 
claim for relief in the complaint. The court has taken the motion for summary judgment under 
advisement 
8. UNUM'S motion for summary judgment raised the issue of whether an insured in 
a first party situation may recover consequential damages, other than attorney's fees (which 
UNUM concedes are recoverable under existing case law), for breach of the express terms of the 
insurance contract. UNUM's motion also raised the issue of whether a private cause of action 
exists under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-26-301 ("Timely Payment of Claims"). These issues have 
led to the certified question and are addressed in the Discussion below. 
DISCUSSION 
1. Consequential Damages 
UNUM asserted in its summary judgment motion that under Beck v. Farmers Insurance. 
Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985) and Billings v. Union Bankers Insurance Company, 918 P. 
2d 461 (Utah 1996), the only damages available to Mr. Machan for breach of the express terms 
of his insurance contract are the insurance benefits under the policy (which have been paid to 
date), prejudgment interest assuming the criteria are met, and attorneys fees if Mr. Machan can 
prove that the fees were foreseeable at the time the parties entered into the insurance contract 
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UNUM contends that consequential damages, other than attorney's fees, are not recoverable for 
bare breach of an insurance contract. 
UNUM urged that according to Beck and Billings, consequential damages, other than 
attorney's fees, are recoverable only for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing in order to remove any incentive for insurers to breach the duty of good faith by 
expanding their exposure beyond the predictable fixed dollar amount of coverage provided by 
the policy. UNUM argued that this incentive would be abrogated if these same consequential 
damages are made available for breach of the express covenants in an insurance contract. To 
allow an insured to recover damages beyond the policy coverage in the absence of bad faith 
would effectively deny any careful insurer the option of declining to pay a contested claim and 
awaiting the outcome of the dispute. 
UNUM further agued that the consequential damages claimed by Mr. Machan, i.e., 
worsening of his psychological condition, inability to afford psychological treatment for himself 
and his mentally ill son, depletion of his assets and savings in order to meet basic living 
expenses, and the inability to have any significant gainful employment due to his worsened 
psychological condition, assuming that Mr. Machan can otherwise prove that these claimed 
losses meet the criteria for consequential damages, fall within the scope of consequential 
damages that Beck and Billings said are the remedy for breach of the covenant of good faith in 
order to remove any incentive for insurers to breach their implied covenant. Finally, UNUM 
argued that its position has been confirmed by statements made recently by the Utah Supreme 
Court in Campbell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 2001 UT 89, 432 Utah 
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Adv. Rep. 44, 2001 Utah LEXIS 170 (Utah 2001), rev'don other grounds, _ U.S. , 123 
S.Ct. 1513(2003). 
In response to UNUM's position, Mr. Machan cited, among other authorities, Pacific 
Coast Title Insurance Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 325 P.2d 906 (Utah 1958); 
Cratz v. Heritage Imports, 71 P.3d 188, ff 48-51 (Utah App. 2003); and Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts, § 351, and argued that under general contract law, damages which are reasonably 
foreseeable to the parties when the contract was made, have always been recoverable, indeed, 
since the days of Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341,156 Emg. Rep. 145 (1854). Mr. Machan 
contends that when allowing a broad range of tort-like damages under a breach of implied 
covenants of good faith and fair dealing (as set forth in Beck, supra) that the Utah Supreme Court 
did not abrogate the recovery of well recognized consequential damages arising from a breach of 
contract. Instead, the Court simply expanded the remedies where the insurer has also breached 
the implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing. 
Mr. Machan asserted that the "incentive" theory urged by UNUM to justify a partial 
abrogation of general contract law regarding damages, exists without eliminating historical 
damages, since insurers have adequate incentive to avoid liability for a much broader range of 
tort-like damages available under a breach of the implied covenant of good faith. Mr. Machan 
argued that Billings, instead of restricting historical contract damages, held only that without a 
violation of the implied covenants, this broad range of tort-like damages is not recoverable. To 
reach any other position, concluded Mr. Machan, would give unfair preferential treatment to 
insurance companies over all other non-insurance parties who breach contracts. 
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Mr. Machan proffered evidence that, based on the testimony of UNUM's representatives 
and based on UNUM's own marketing material, it was foreseeable to UNUM that if UNUM 
breaches the insurance contract, Mr. Machan would suffer consequential damages beyond the 
insurance benefits. 
2. UtahCodeAnn.§31A-26-301 
The applicable part of Utah Code Ann. § 31A-26-301(l), effective in 2000, stated: 
Unless otherwise provided by law, an insurer shall timely pay every 
valid insurance claim made by an insured. 
UNUM asserted in its summary judgment motion that § 31 A-26-301(l) does not provide 
a private cause of action; that absent specific direction from the legislature, Utah Courts 
routinely decline to create private rights of action based on alleged violations of statutes. See 
e.g., Milliner v. Elmer Fox & Co., 529 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah 1974); Broadbent v. Bd. ofEduc. of 
Cache Cty., 910 P.2d 1274, 1278 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), cert, denied, 917 P. 2d 556 (Utah 1996); 
J.H. v. D.H. v. West Valley City, 840 P.2d 115, 125 (Utah 1992); Richards Irr. Co. v. Karren. 
880 P. 2d 6 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). No Utah decision has ever recognized a private cause of 
action under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-26-301. 
In response to UNUM's position, Mr. Machan argued that he is a member of the class of 
persons which the statute was designated to protect and that the elements necessary to imply a 
private right of action are met, citing Spackman v. B.D. of Ed. Box Elder County School District, 
16 P.3d 533, 538 (Utah 2000), and § 874A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1979). Mr. 
Machan further argued that the expressed purpose of the Utah Insurance Code, including Chapter 
26, is to protect claimants under insurance policies form unfair claims adjustment practices. ( 
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Utah Code Ann. §§ 31 A-102(2) and 31 A-26-10l(3). Mr. Machan also contends that the 
statutory language itself demonstrates a legislative intent to create a private cause of action. 
Finally, Mr, Machan argued that the legislative history of § 31A-26-301 demonstrates an intent 
to allow a private cause of action. 
It appears to the court that the issue of whether Section 31A-26-301 provided a private 
cause of action in the year 2000 is closely related to the consequential damages issue, and that 
both questions overlap and are complimentary. For these reasons, the court seeks an answer as 
to whether Section 31 A-26-301 provided a private cause of action in 2000. 
The two questions that are certified are controlling in this case. Mr. Machan claims to 
have suffered consequential damage from the denial of disability benefits. The issue is neither 
trivial, nor is it collateral. Having found no controlling Utah law to resolve these issues, and 
upon the belief that the issue concerning Section 31 A-26-301 is complimentary to the 
consequential damages question, and in the interest of cooperative federalism, the court believes 
that these questions of Utah law presented in this case are best answered by the Utah Supreme 
Court. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This Court concludes that the questions of law outlined above are unsettled under 
existing Utah law. Accordingly, the clerk of this Court shall transmit a copy of this Order of 
Certification to counsel for all parties to the proceedings in this Court. The clerk shall also 
submit to the Utah Supreme Court a certified copy of this Order of Certification, together with 
the parties' respective summary judgment memoranda, the hearing transcript for July 29,2003, 
and any other portion of the record before this Court that may be required by the Utah Supreme 
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Court. Pursuant to Rule 41(f) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, this Court orders that 
each party shall bear its own fees and costs of this certification. 
IT IS SO ORDERED this > ^ day of £ f l H ^ , 2003. 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorable Paul G. Cassell 
United States District Court 
h-r~b- cvr'-ify K>ni the r^.n^ed (document is a true 
~:n<: OCTOC* cor?<f o? the ciqinni on ffte in this office. 
AJ7E5T: MA5KUS B. ZIMMHR 
CJefk, U.S. District Court 
District of Utan * .
 # 
Date: Yifzm. 
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Approved as to form: 
c / ^ c h L. Humph^/ys, 
Christensen & Jense* 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. Bruce Badger, Esq. 
Scott M Petersen, Esq. 
Fabian & Clendenin 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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tsh 
United States District Court 
for the 
District of Utah 
September 23, 2003 
* * CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE OF CLERK * * 
Re: 2:00-cv-00904 
True and correct copies of the attached were either mailed, faxed or e-mailed 
by the clerk to the following: 
Julianne R. Blanch, Esq* 
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 EXCHANGE PLACE 
PO BOX 45000 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84145-5000 
JFAX 9,3630400 
L. Rich Humpherys, Esq. 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN PC 
50 S MAIN STE 1500 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84144 
JFAX 9,3553472 
Scott M. Petersen, Esq. 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
215 S STATE STE 1200 
PO BOX 510210 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84151 
EMAIL 
Thomas J. Quinn, Esq. 
UNUM LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 
2211 CONGRESS ST 
PORTLAND, ME 04122-0590 
John Meagher, Esq. 
SHUTTS & BOWEN 
1500 MIAMI CENTER 
201 S BISCAYNE BLVD 
MIAMI, FL 33131 
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PART HI 
CLAIM PRACTICES 
31A-26-301. Timely payment of claims. 
(1) Unless otherwise provided by law, an insurer shall 
timely pay every valid insurance claim made by an insured-
By rule the commissioner may prescribe the kinds of notice 
and proof of loss that will establish validity, the manner in 
which an insurer may make a bona fide denial of a claim, the 
periods of time within which payment id required to be made 
to be timely, and the reasonable interest rates to be charged 
upon late claim payments. 
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the payment of a claim 
is not overdue during any period in which the insurer is 
unable to pay the claim because there is no recipient legally 
able to give a valid release for the payment, or in which the 
insurer is unable to determine who is entitled to receive the 
payment, provided that the insurer has promptly notified the 
claimant of the inabihty and has offered in good faith to pay 
the claim promptly when the inabihty is removed. 
(3) This section applies only to claims made by claimants in 
direct privity of contract with the insurer. 1935 
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PART in 
CLAIM PRACTICES 
31A-26-301. Timely payment of claims* 
(1) (a) Unless otherwise provided by law, an insurer shall 
timely pay every valid insurance claim made by an 
insured* 
(b) By rule the commissioner may prescribe: 
(i) the kinds of notice and proof of loss that will 
establish validity; 
(ii) the manner in which an insurer may make a 
bona fide denial of a claims 
„ (iii) the periods of time within which payment is 
required to be made to be timely; and 
(iv) the reasonable interest rates to be charged 
upon late claim payments, 
(2) (a) Notwithstanding Subsection (1) and subject to Sub-
section (2Kb), the payment, of a claim is not overdue 
during any period in which: 
(i) the insurer is unable to pay the claim because 
there is no recipient legally able to give a valid 
release for the payment; or 
(ii) the insurer is unable to determine who is 
entitled to receive the payment, 
(b) Subsection (2)(a) applies only if the insurer: 
(i) promptly notifies the claimant of the inability to 
pay the claim; and 
(ii) offers in good faith to pay the claim promptly 
when the inability to pay the claim is removed. 
(3) This section applies only to a claim for first party 
benefits made by a person who is: 
(a) named or defined as an insured under the terms of 
an insurance policy; 
(b) described as a covered person under the terms of a 
policy of health care insurance as define^ in Section 
31A-l-301;or 
(c) named, defined, or described: 
* (i) as: 
(A) an insured; 
(B) a beneficiary; 
(C) a policyholder; or 
(D) otherwise covered person; and 
(ii) under the terms of: 
(A) a life insurance policy; or 
(B) an annuity. 2002 
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